NEYRO EVIDENCE LEDGER / RESEARCH BRIEF 01

What happened to the funds?


Neyro / Aurum · BNB Smart Chain

A plain-language account of the shared-pool withdrawals, wallet-draining mechanism and onward transfers examined in public blockchain records.

Records reviewed 1 November 2026 · Revised 2 November 2026 · Version 1.1 · All times UTC


Two observed transfer routes

A · Pool cash-out address: 0x02ee…5D9c



Six pool withdrawals totaled **1,200,000 USDT** on 30 July. The cash-out address sent **1,150,000 USDT** onward through 12 addresses that day.

B · Wallet-drain collector: 0x93d7…8765



The collector sent **850,000 USDT** to one deposit address on 30 July. That address forwarded the same amount to a Binance-labeled hot wallet.

Different collector means a different sending address.

Route A’s cash-out address is **0x02ee…5D9c**. Route B’s collector is **0x93d7…8765**. The distinction is the source of the outgoing payment, not just whether its final destination is FixedFloat or Binance.

Is the 850,000 part of the 1.2 million or 1.15 million? The traced records do not establish that connection. They also do not prove two completely independent pots of money: an earlier or indirect connection remains possible.

Read the totals correctly: 1.2 million and 1.15 million describe successive stages of Route A; do not add them. All figures are transfer totals, not maximum balances, total platform holdings or individual losses.

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When did it happen?

There is no independently established single timestamp for “the hack.” The records show platform operations before 30 July, a wallet-draining mechanism, and large movements on 30 July.

DATE / UTC	OBSERVATION	WHAT THE RECORDS SHOW
28 Jun 2026 12:55:29	Pool position created	Position NFT #6927228 was minted to account 0x3fc7…1405.
29 Jun 2026 11:08:07–11:09:28	Deposit contract set up	The same account deployed 0x76aA…2B51, received its administrator role and configured position #6927228.
14 Jul 2026 07:44:36	Earlier pool withdrawal	200,000 USDT moved from the pool to 0x02ee…5D9c. Large withdrawals predate 30 July.
23 Jul 2026 17:14:39	Batch mechanism already in use	The earliest examined collector transaction used the draining contract to pull 1 USDC from one wallet. This alone does not date the beginning of the whole incident.
30 Jul 2026 01:08:56	250-wallet USDT batch	One successful transaction pulled 810.161816863383516354 USDT from 250 wallets to collector 0x93d7…8765.
30 Jul 2026 05:11:47–13:26:24	Six pool collections	Six payments of 200,000 USDT totaled 1,200,000 USDT into cash-out address 0x02ee…5D9c.
30 Jul 2026 05:16:49–18:59:31	Forwarding toward FixedFloat	The 12 examined paths carried 1,150,000 USDT from the cash-out address to the service-labeled wallet.
30 Jul 2026 10:18:14–12:40:03	Forwarding toward Binance	Nine collector payments totaled 850,000 USDT; eight onward sweeps moved that total into the hot wallet.

How the wallet-draining mechanism worked

A token allowance is permission for another contract to spend a token from a wallet. In the examined batch, caller 0x98e7…4e41 invoked draining contract 0x9b17…5016. The successful receipt recorded 250 USDT transfers into collector 0x93d7…8765. A further signature from each wallet at that moment was not required.

A small transfer is not automatically a test. A batch may take a wallet’s entire remaining balance even when that balance is small. This is separate from money the investor had already paid into the platform.

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The address directory

The short labels in the diagrams and ledgers refer to these exact addresses. Links open the corresponding BscScan pages. Service names are public explorer labels, not verified customer identities.

ID	ROLE IN THE EXAMINED RECORDS	FULL ADDRESS
D	Neyro deposit contract	0x76aaa5d887608377b3cd28b33fa9378d6fb62b51
P	Shared USDT / USDC pool	0x92b7807bf19b7dddf89b706143896d05228f3121
M	PancakeSwap position manager	0x46a15b0b27311cedf172ab29e4f4766fbe7f4364
O	Deposit administrator / pool caller	0x3fc7b3ccbf01f20ec5f130484a777bd0e7d01405
C	Pool cash-out address	0x02ee5d9a5f0cc02c0a97a17c929d93c043805d9c
F	FixedFloat-labeled receiving wallet	0x4727250679294802377dd6ca6541b8e459077c95
R	Examined draining contract	0x9b172e2d896f2f1392e9b4edd4a54af951935016
T	Caller of the draining contract	0x98e7906b5ad64597971a991e20419078b6174e41
K	Wallet-drain collector	0x93d77915179b45b54eb4268be08afe1771928765
B	Exchange-linked deposit address	0x2bfc43abaa244edfe531736b168df8ab2c4bc6e0
H	Binance 51-labeled hot wallet	0x8894e0a0c962cb723c1976a4421c95949be2d4e3
W01	Forwarding address · 50,000 USDT	0x1e5006294765d342476fa132e3079fa3c6eff7bc
W02	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xbf3ec109ece0af7d1a66b745449a1d83b29574e6
W03	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0x616bd98477f64545c1987b042a6f66a174e65a45
W04	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xd30b17fb84b437983714967d3ea15a365085a52d
W05	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0x6a03f726e22c0aad9bb3d7670e94ea2efec61c00
W06	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xe5bbe0d2e9d29a0871994df4d4f79f8db77cb7ba
W07	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0x6a693895bae9eb2f15ea31760091e0b62c66d128
W08	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xfd409b35e0561d759407665df81a5f685d7d2449
W09	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xd2f1f5dda3bbcdee155b72892ee23593394cc2a4
W10	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0x1f85d698acf3991a8786825fca47bb5b244ce6df
W11	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xf2079143299d41ef4850347d0cb6d89e629f8000
W12	Forwarding address · 100,000 USDT	0xd3837d40e220d0195d9fc58ee8869fd310fb3559

The amounts in this report use the actual USDT contract below. Token symbols alone were not accepted. USDC appears only in the earlier 1-USDC mechanism observation.

0x55d398326f99059ff775485246999027b3197955
USDT / BSC-USD token contract

0x8ac76a51cc950d9822d68b83fe1ad97b32cd580d
USDC token contract

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Route A: money out of the pool

The six examined collections used position #6927228 and the same initiating account, O, which had set up the deposit contract. The calls used the standard position-manager collect function.

1 · Shared pool P → cash-out address C

REF	30 JUL 2026 / UTC	USDT	TRANSACTION HASH — CLICK TO VERIFY
A01	30 Jul 05:11:47	200,000	0x678777b67e0c93e01c1d1c5d381cf7214a5c681517788b24ae0a7cdcd5c6828d
A02	30 Jul 09:44:32	200,000	0x14c8f38cdbdf10598efe0d72d5a25b0bc2d7aed54389ef106d92f55744de145c
A03	30 Jul 11:02:17	200,000	0x80800ff3e39f9f017d5d150e32777a2f34571149c9331cf55f4187ca47806d72
A04	30 Jul 11:40:25	200,000	0xe45b1b40479e240bbcef7fc6b1421178539b721e26179310aaec74d6dccf8d83
A05	30 Jul 12:35:40	200,000	0x116472dedfa1a1e325c31346acc24c46365fcdc156fd6a70095eb3c577544405
A06	30 Jul 13:26:24	200,000	0x6aee8f93677e8c6168e7dbd71b20367003f2c6bf47859a53f4b03429187d292c

Total: 1,200,000 USDT in six transfers.

2 · Cash-out address C → forwarding addresses W01–W12

Each W reference identifies the receiving address on page 3. The next page follows its onward transfer.

REF	30 JUL 2026 / UTC	USDT	TRANSACTION HASH — CLICK TO VERIFY
W01	30 Jul 05:16:49	50,000	0xd129a64f8b587569a1bc27f4159b21b76c0824b28c9d352cd321bfdb939e680c
W02	30 Jul 06:28:23	100,000	0xc81a439e86d7519b5b8868c9461e51b595f8ee0538d1ab8b9f3fa554b09ca33b
W03	30 Jul 09:45:13	100,000	0x529da38077089b4da80af69f233eb9719ff41ae2d8f8e94522c15d5a302e33b7
W04	30 Jul 09:49:01	100,000	0x25863c938866adc8e09d2ddbd688b6a90b650d3689fb62b30ef612419099d887
W05	30 Jul 11:03:30	100,000	0x963aa698ccc90f44488a2455663c6af7c6356c99171bab3493305c7596dbe716
W06	30 Jul 11:05:22	100,000	0xbbeb769da6df5930c7368509134d28234571b26b5666cfd61cb68cf623a0f27f
W07	30 Jul 11:41:12	100,000	0x407abab9285c10c7bf7bb013e7482e36fb477a54a5e6fb8e009690ca048a1af0
W08	30 Jul 11:48:39	100,000	0xb395b44a68951144f56a29aa9d0b49f79e788f8643fc06c971e78dd13c579b5f
W09	30 Jul 12:36:14	100,000	0xd0e5700acd6c7a72442a6c3825ccca44ef6860e971e273e21257e71dd864bd69
W10	30 Jul 12:38:45	100,000	0x57f08ed2624dce628f1d6094e3a5c74810bda47df4123f7a4c4b40953f083d99
W11	30 Jul 13:26:50	100,000	0x0916e879ce8880e3c03bc26bfcab35a9e87e588b650037c4fc93f1166f308304
W12	30 Jul 13:32:38	100,000	0xa56dc5c8c0e300d4a24e3b387e02bc1f184bab0b36fe58b8319f6b46ba747ecb

Total: 1,150,000 USDT in twelve substantial payments.

The same account had already collected 200,000 USDT on 14 July. These observations show use of existing operator authority. They do not establish whether the key holder acted deliberately or someone compromised that key.

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Route A: where the forwarding paths ended

All twelve examined forwarding addresses sent their substantial receipts onward to F, the FixedFloat-labeled address. Each returned address history contained two or three token-transfer rows.

Sender: the W address shown in the reference column. Recipient: F on page 3.

REF	30 JUL 2026 / UTC	USDT	TRANSACTION HASH — CLICK TO VERIFY
W01	30 Jul 05:19:02	50,000	0x8244f5cddd33998ce258608fb511c1a19ff55d66e04103acb7d05870bf315639
W02	30 Jul 06:29:32	100,000.0001	0x9aef6b01c1a501ea577dec331fd9e4a530896a13b0eb684cdc3b35c7c6b3d98a
W03	30 Jul 09:47:24	100,000	0x23919335f57d3ade9857d41205caeb88c11955627a59499aa9e7e9db14e6ce32
W04	30 Jul 09:51:16	100,000	0x4c4ce513cdd8ed399b60f8cde6353660fd72cdcfba4b46fdce164aaf5e1964df
W05	30 Jul 11:06:05	100,000	0xa6b89ccecefba37833e259deab8deb9e7f85c13a11c8174b19c6db0cf20e6163
W06	30 Jul 18:59:31	100,000	0xb0fb05e0735b77b9fc112f6535de4013866c07be939daa837c6fed2ba29e8280
W07	30 Jul 11:43:29	100,000	0xdf60d851fa44a459d9fd489fb81d47b623a6aad30e74bed8d6039a8df33cb289
W08	30 Jul 11:51:00	100,000	0xe0a4711e6fb3d014fe7a95b8907b6491b1b0a71d2c2f0e2c524efd12a9b3fa8f
W09	30 Jul 12:38:43	100,000	0x324f83200c89b0113b64dce3ae947e8a7932befd8c449d99cc1864069f4b854d
W10	30 Jul 12:41:08	100,000	0x1c4d1b861ca2be5816ed05e28e2b3e395c7d2c85fbd9e95fedd7fbafc16e063c
W11	30 Jul 13:29:07	100,000	0x08b837589c71290e84989e2aa5843b1bb8f8c34ff341b9a1a2ed23a58b9c12a9
W12	30 Jul 13:36:58	100,000	0xf12cabc12063fc92746dda60ae9c48370f32208f7ab2d4084b8d25718f9714fa

Principal traced: 1,150,000 USDT

One forwarding address also received 0.0001 USDT of unrelated dust. It forwarded that dust with its 100,000-USDT receipt. The actual sum of these twelve onward transfers is 1,150,000.0001 USDT; only 1,150,000 USDT came from the examined cash-out payments.

What this route establishes

It identifies the common receiving address and the exact transfers that reached it. Public explorers label this address FixedFloat. The service’s own records would be needed to confirm control, match the relevant orders and identify their payout assets, networks and destinations.

The 1.15-million figure is not the maximum balance of C or D. The records examined do not establish a historical peak balance or the platform’s total loss.

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Route B: collector to exchange

The 850,000 USDT was sent by collector K (0x93d7...8765). Route A’s cash-out sender C (0x02ee...5D9c) is a different address. The traced records do not establish that the 850,000 came from Route A’s 1.2-million or 1.15-million flow. An earlier or indirect connection remains possible.

1 · Collector K → deposit address B

REF	30 JUL 2026 / UTC	USDT	TRANSACTION HASH — CLICK TO VERIFY
D01	30 Jul 10:18:14	50,000	0x2cb77e4f15a4344d16dda486747caacaf127d151f56b9d8fb60f1827546dd688
D02	30 Jul 10:32:32	100,000	0x03e71307f95ad1ba4d08af6b8f5bc0b8244fc6b4ffb0a9e1b8b7f8615cb36dad
D03	30 Jul 10:48:37	100,000	0x9d101fb5469a032476c9726977dc662beb5e7b4745a4f093eb8bc4b31d46a710
D04	30 Jul 10:56:00	100,000	0x20c36586e40c82cf510682f64745caa115d0077ecfa3f12bedafdcb72bb7c647
D05	30 Jul 11:08:23	100,000	0xecdcbcf971cd80ca8e496ec3c4e4d0fa98019d61ca2fc16cfef547586feb6586
D06	30 Jul 11:30:36	100,000	0xf7c762d730e0dc707ef3eecbd6f1defbf348b0347ffaee0ba5bcfb86c936f49d
D07	30 Jul 11:45:45	100,000	0xae4a70ecb3699d8be574dafff5dea88f6a370df0b6d9ff7727e484453f785541
D08	30 Jul 11:51:35	100,000	0xec3141afc52aec839fcdf8637c0a66f7a523bfc1b5399ac69aecac49782e67be
D09	30 Jul 12:36:25	100,000	0xf638c133ac1ed79c6966b529f23c3498449b3ba60f2c3c14919377955962c475

Total: 850,000 USDT in nine transfers.

2 · Deposit address B → Binance-labeled hot wallet H

REF	30 JUL 2026 / UTC	USDT	TRANSACTION HASH — CLICK TO VERIFY
E01	30 Jul 10:20:10	50,000	0x05912af31aed1f0223b05d8834137eda05c163c9fcc460ff1cc40f173bc3f554
E02	30 Jul 10:40:11	100,000	0xc1124b226d53338e641607c461faa38c8d031849707bc8be0d8a43f8d28afead
E03	30 Jul 10:53:17	100,000	0xaf4b331784751e73c6f585e4aaece5ca4debdedccab857cf6c4d00407ede8106
E04	30 Jul 11:00:11	100,000	0xef1c150dbc990c2c2394d0217263ed64d61e484a0a3b65c82ea4f9f504ed824f
E05	30 Jul 11:13:23	100,000	0x4a32425e99d92623512b382de3991f8ca23b927a88d1d2ab42c8cb3a4947875b
E06	30 Jul 11:40:11	100,000	0xf30510f0414699b2618dce37f58982387c0a783905e574eaa8fcc4e209fd35c4
E07	30 Jul 11:59:39	200,000	0xf3f8f1dc07f6784bebdabc96a2435a94d05a4d2bb293401c29a71c38e3c5d12b
E08	30 Jul 12:40:03	100,000	0x28e6634c329813c0e26d720db482a1502e7e9242c4451642da7c55d5c9236aee

Total: 850,000 USDT in eight onward sweeps.

Two 100,000-USDT receipts were combined into one 200,000-USDT sweep. The deposit address’s returned history contained 77 rows; the collector’s outgoing history contained 262 unique rows over three pages.

The collector pooled funds from many wallets. This route cannot identify which particular investor’s tokens were credited to an internal exchange account. The exchange can confirm account attribution and subsequent internal movements from its own records.

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How to use this report

Keep the distinction between observed transfers, service-label attribution and conclusions that require additional records.

What is directly supported

The transaction dates, token contracts, source and destination addresses, exact amounts, the six decoded pool-collection calls, the operator’s contract-creation receipt, the position NFT mint and the onward-transfer paths. The 250-wallet batch is supported by its calldata and successful receipt, which contains 250 USDT Transfer logs.

What is not established

The identity of a key holder; whether an outside hacker compromised the platform; common human control of the pool operator and wallet-drain caller; whether an earlier or indirect transfer connects the two observed routes; individual beneficial ownership of commingled funds; the platform’s total holdings or historical maximum balance; the amount recoverable by any investor; or current availability for freezing.

Where records requests could help

For B, an investigator can ask the relevant exchange to confirm address control, the account credited by the nine transfers and subsequent internal movements. For F, the relevant swap service could confirm the twelve transfers’ orders and payout destinations. Lawful requests may also seek relevant account-opening and access records that the provider retains. No request has been sent and no recovery outcome is promised.

Method and scope

This brief uses saved BSCTrace explorer responses for transaction details, successful receipts and transfer lists. Calculations use integer token units. Only the actual USDT contract contributes to the listed USDT totals. Exact duplicate events, zero-value entries and similarly named fake tokens do not inflate these figures. This is a bounded review of selected records, not a complete archival-node audit. The 47-row companion CSV contains the same paths with full sender and recipient addresses.

Sources and independent verification

BSCTrace public explorer data service ↗

PancakeSwap: position-manager fields and collect function ↗

Public label for FixedFloat receiving address F ↗

Public label for Binance 51 hot wallet H ↗

Supporting investigation: CrYptOG pooled-fund report ↗

Supporting investigation: CrYptOG wallet-drain report ↗

Supporting investigation: TraceHunt Aurum timeline and routes ↗

Supporting investigations provide context. The amounts and paths in this brief were reconstructed from the downloaded explorer records; service labels remain attribution leads. Every hash in the ledgers opens its BscScan record.

Earlier / mechanism records: 28 June position mint · 29 June deposit-contract creation · 14 July earlier collection · 30 July 250-wallet batch

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